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Abstract. Implementation attacks like side-channel and fault attacks
pose a considerable threat to cryptographic devices that are physically
accessible by an attacker. As a consequence, devices like smart cards
implement corresponding countermeasures like redundant computation
and masking. Recently, statistically ineffective fault attacks (SIFA) were
shown to be able to circumvent these classical countermeasure tech-
niques. We present a new approach for verifying the SIFA protection
of arbitrary masked implementations in both hardware and software.
The proposed method uses Boolean dependency analysis, factorization,
and known properties of masked computations to show whether the fault
detection mechanism of redundant masked circuits can leak information
about the processed secret values. We implemented this new method in a
tool called Danira, which can show the SIFA resistance of cryptographic
implementations like AES S-Boxes within minutes.
1 Introduction
Cryptographic primitives are primarily designed to withstand mathematical at-
tacks in a black-box setting. However, when these primitives are deployed in
the real world, they find themselves in a grey-box setting in which an attacker
may try to force faulty computations or observe additional physical side-channel
information, such as instantaneous power consumption. This improved attacker
capability simplifies the extraction of secrets like cryptographic keys.
Active implementation attacks, such as fault analysis [9,7], and passive side-
channel attacks, like power or electromagnetic (EM) analysis [25,26], are among
the most serious threats for implementations of cryptographic algorithms. A
common algorithmic countermeasure strategy against these attacks is the com-
bination of masking against power analysis with redundant computation against
fault attacks. Masking is a secret-sharing technique where one splits a crypto-
graphic computation into d+ 1 random shares. This technique ensures that the
observation of up to d intermediate values of that masked computation does not
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reveal any information about native (unmasked) values [23,20,21,6,15]. Redun-
dant computation tries to prevent the release of faulty cryptographic computa-
tions caused by environmental influences or malicious tampering such as voltage
glitches, lasers, or rapid temperature variations. Without this countermeasure,
an attacker with access to faulty computations can learn information about the
used cryptographic key in many different ways [3,22,16].
Researchers long believed that the combination of redundancy and masking
could adequately deal with active and passive implementation attacks. How-
ever, it was recently shown that when using statistical ineffective fault attacks
(SIFA), even such protected cryptographic implementations are vulnerable to
rather straightforward implementation attacks [13,12,14]. The key observation
behind SIFA attacks is that a cryptographic key may correlate with the sup-
pression of a faulted cryptographic computation. Thus, the attacker can obtain
information about this key by observing whether the output of a faulted cryp-
tographic computation is suppressed by a redundancy countermeasure or not.
For example, if a 1-bit signal carries a secret value, and the attacker can
force this signal to zero, they can learn the secret value by observing whether
or not this fault is detected. While this simplified example is obvious, SIFA is
interesting because it works even if the fault injection targets just one share of
a masked secret. In fact, SIFA is exploitable even if the attacker does not know
the exact effect of a fault injection on the faulted value [12].
Most proposed mitigation techniques against SIFA so far use error correc-
tion, which is however costly when combined with masking [11,28]. Another
recently proposed SIFA mitigation tries to solve this issue with a careful com-
bination of redundancy, masking, and reversible computing [10], achieving pro-
tection against SIFA without significant overheads. The authors give detailed
circuit descriptions of protected cipher components that can be mapped into
concrete software or hardware implementations. However, even minor modifica-
tions of the circuit description due to human error, compilers, or synthesis tools,
although preserving functional equivalence, may make the circuit vulnerable to
SIFA. Consequently, there is a high demand for tooling that can support design-
ers in building efficient cryptographic implementations resistant against power
analysis and fault attacks, including SIFA.
1.1 Related Work
The empirical and formal verification of power analysis and fault attack coun-
termeasures is an already well established topic in the cryptographic research
community [1,4,8,19,17,18,24]. On a conceptual level, the verification of masking
countermeasures — ensuring that individual computations are unrelated to any
cryptographic secret — does perform statistical independence checks that could
also be adapted for verifying SIFA protection, i.e., that cryptographic secrets
do not correlate with the suppression of a faulted cryptographic computation.
However, in the following we argue that such existing tools either cannot be
easily adapted for SIFA verification, or would come with performance overheads
that make them unattractive for practical use.
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Tools like Rebecca [8] and its successor Coco [19] use correlation track-
ing to show statistical independence in (sequential) masked hardware circuits.
Although their method ignores the strength and sign of correlations for per-
formance reasons, the remaining information is still sufficient to show standard
probing resistance of masked circuits. However, these approximations are not ap-
plicable for SIFA verification. Since Rebecca and Coco do not track the sign
of correlations, there is no way to distinguish the correlation sets of a negated
value from a non-negated value. Due to the nature of bit-flip faults, this method
leads to falsely reported leaks due to the structure of the fault-detection mech-
anism. Similarly, tools like maskVerif [4] rely on security proofs for a gate’s
input signals to prove the gate’s security. According to our investigation, since
the fault-detection mechanism combines the shares in its sub-formulas, a leakage
report is triggered even though the value cannot be observed.
Exact methods like SILVER [24] use some form of model counting to track ex-
act probability distributions of values within masked circuits and check whether
the correlation strength is zero for all secret values. These methods could be
adopted for SIFA verification, e.g., by using a strategy as outlined in Figure 1
but will lead to verification runtimes significantly higher compared to the ap-
proach that we will present in this paper.
Besides masking verification tools, there also exists VerFI [2], a verification
tool dedicated to fault attacks that, amongst others, does have the capability
to verify SIFA protection of a given circuit in certain scenarios. More precisely,
VerFI can detect SIFA vulnerability of a given circuits using an empirical and
simulation-based approach that essentially checks if either (1) all fault injections
are being corrected through error correction methods, or (2) all fault injections
are being detected via redundancy methods. This empirical approach can be
used for error-correction-based SIFA countermeasures, however, VerFI is not
suited for the verification of, e.g., the more efficient SIFA countermeasure design
by Daemen et al.[10] that does not need be able to correct any possible fault
injection.
1.2 Contribution
The contribution of this paper is threefold and consists of a method and its
implementation, its evaluation, and resulting SIFA-resistant circuit artifacts.
Method. We present a formal verification approach to determine whether a
masked redundant cipher implementation is SIFA resistant within a well-defined
attacker model. Our verification approach checks whether the output of the
fault-detection mechanism correlates with secrets used in the computation. We
present three properties and their respective checking methods that serve as
sufficient conditions for SIFA protection. (Incompleteness): If a function δ does
not functionally depend on all shares of a secret s, it cannot leak the secret.
(Hiding): If a function δ can be written as m ⊕ δ′, where m is a uniformly
distributed random variable and δ′ is functionally independent of m, δ does
not leak information about any secrets. (Inferred independence): For a function
δ =
∨
i δi, if all linear combinations of its partial functions δi are statistically
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independent of a secret s, δ cannot leak the secret s. We present an algorithm
that uses these sufficient but not necessary conditions to prove the security of
circuits. Our tool Danira implements this algorithm and is, to our knowledge, the
first tool for formal verification of SIFA resistance of masked redundant circuits.
Evaluation. We provide an experimental evaluation of our method. Because
the sufficient conditions may not be able to prove SIFA resistance, we show in our
experimental section that the approach gives precise results for a representative
range of secure circuits. If Danira cannot prove resistance, it provides fault
locations that might leak information about the secrets. We show that Danira
can accurately prove security or find bugs in S-Boxes, the non-linear parts of
cryptographic implementations, in minutes or even seconds. With respect to
SIFA verification, masked linear layers do not need any further analysis as fault
injections in these components are not exploitable with SIFA. Ultimately, we
give practical examples illustrating that, even when a design is secure against
SIFA on paper, vulnerabilities may arise as a result of simple compiler/synthesis
optimizations, which can then however be identified with Danira.
Artifacts. As a direct result of this work, we present the first SIFA-resistant
Verilog implementations of Daemen et al.[10] designs for a masked AES S-Box,
the Keccak χ3 S-Box, and all classes of quadratic 4-bit S-Boxes.
2 Preliminaries
Masking is an algorithmic countermeasure that, while primarily intended to
prevent power analysis attacks, also plays an essential role in SIFA attacks. In
a masked cipher implementation, each input, output, and intermediate variable
is split into d + 1 shares so that their Xor is equal to the original native vari-
able [23]. In Boolean masking, a native variable s is split random shares s0 . . . sd
that satisfy s = s0 ⊕ . . . ⊕ sd. As long as an attacker cannot observe a set of
values statistically dependent on all d + 1 shares of a native value, the compu-
tation is secure against classical power analysis techniques. Dealing with linear
functions is trivial as they can be computed on each share individually. However,
implementing masking for non-linear functions (S-Boxes) requires computations
on all shares, which is more challenging to implement securely and correctly, and
thus the main interest in the literature.
Redundant computation is an implementation-level fault attack counter-
measure for cryptographic computations. The main idea is to perform the same
computation several times and release a result only if the redundant computa-
tions match. This check prevents cases where an attacker forces faults in the
computation, leading to incorrect results that correlate with native secrets [3].
Figure 1 shows the structure of a fault detection mechanism for redundant com-
putations. If an attacker introduces a fault and the outputs do not match, output
δ signals the faults and prevents the release of the result.
Statistical ineffective fault attacks (SIFA), first presented at CHES
2018 by Dobraunig et al., is a relatively new type of fault attack technique capa-
ble of circumventing common fault/power analysis countermeasures, while being
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Fig. 1. A redundant computation with inputs x0, . . . , xm, which are passed to both
computation instances F 0 and F 1. The disjunction of differences δ0, . . . , δn is used to
determine whether there was a fault in one of the computation instances.
applicable to a wide variety of block ciphers or AEAD schemes [13,14,27,12].
When performing SIFA, an attacker calls a cryptographic operation (e.g. block
cipher) with varying inputs, injects a fault during each of the computations, and
only collects outputs in cases where the fault injection did not cause a faulty
computation result (i.e. the output is not suppressed). This filtered set of outputs
can then be used to perform a key recovery attack on a block cipher as follows.
A typical block cipher design of an iterated round function, consisting of a lin-
ear and non-linear layer, that mixes the current state with the cryptographic key
such that in the end, each bit of the block cipher output is uniformly distributed.
If we now consider, e.g., an AND computation that occurs in the non-linear layer
of a (later) round function, one can observe that a fault-induced difference in
one operand only propagates to the AND output if the other operand is ’1’.
Hence, if an attacker repeatedly calls a block cipher with varying inputs, while
injecting the same difference in each computation, and only collecting outputs
that are correct (not suppressed), a certain intermediate value should show a
bias towards ’0’. Given such a set of faulted but correct block cipher outputs, an
attacker can now make a partial key guess of the last round key and calculate
back to the faulted operation for each collected output (ciphertext). If the partial
key guess was correct, the observed distribution of an intermediate value at that
location should be biased. Otherwise, if the observed distribution is uniform,
the key guess was wrong. For a more complete attack description targeting the
AES-128 block cipher we refer to the description in [12].
If we now additionally consider masked implementations where each inter-
mediate value is split into multiple random shares, filtering outputs based on the
operand of one AND gate is not sufficient anymore. In fact, for SIFA to work in
masked scenarios, the attacker needs to work with fault inductions that cause a
difference that propagates into multiple AND gates that use the shares of one
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Fig. 2. Simplified example of SIFA against masked χ3 using two shares. The induced
difference cancels out, and the attacker learns b0∨b1∨c1. A complete depiction is given
in Appendix A.
native value as other operands. We show this with a small example inspired by
Daemen et al.[10].
Example 1. Consider a masked S-Box implementation that operates on shared
inputs and outputs. For simplicity, assume that we repeatedly call this S-Box
with uniformly distributed inputs and observe the corresponding outputs. Since
an S-Box is a bijective function, uniformly distributed inputs should give uni-
formly distributed outputs. Figure 2 shows a reduced depiction of a masked χ3
S-Box, the smaller version of χ5, which is used in Keccak (SHA-3). The S-
Box takes a 3-bit input, represented by bits a, b and c. Therefore a first-order
masked version of χ3 takes the bits a0, a1, b0, b1, c0, c1 as input, with a = a0⊕a1,
etc.. If we assume a fault targeting a0 at the specified location, the induced
bit-difference propagates into three And-gates that take the bits b0, b1, and c1
as the other inputs. In this case, the bit-difference cancels out and produces a
value δ = b0 ∨ b1 ∨ c1. When a fault is not detected, an attacker knows that b0,
b1, and c1 are all zero, and therefore, b is zero as well. In this concrete case, the
attacker uses a fault injection to filter out computations where the distribution
of b is biased, and uses them to recover the key
Efficient SIFA countermeasures were presented at CHES 2020 [10].
Their SIFA mitigation strategy has almost no overhead and builds upon a care-
ful combination of masking, redundant computation, and reversible computing.
They show that, by building non-linear operations from incomplete and invert-
ible building blocks, they achieve implementations where a single fault in the
computation is either (1) not exploitable by SIFA, or (2) detectable via redun-
dant computations. This approach is comparably easy to implement for small
S-Boxes and can also be extended to larger S-Boxes such as the AES S-Box.
An example of a masked χ3 implementation that is built from incomplete and
invertible building blocks is given in Appendix B.
Boolean formulas are a symbolic composition of Boolean variables using
logic operators. For a propositional boolean formula f , we write Var(f) to refer
to the variables that occur in f . When clear from context, we write V to denote
a superset of all used variables, i.e., Var(f) ⊆ V . The partial evaluation of f ,
where a variable q is assigned a value p ∈ B is written as f [q ← p]. Given a set
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of variables Q and an assignment α : Q→ B, we write f [α] to denote the partial
evaluation of f where each variable in Q is assigned according to α.
We say that a formula f is functionally dependent on a variable x if and only
if the concrete value of x ∈ B has an influence on the value of f ∈ B. Henceforth,
for a given formula f , we write D(f) ⊆ Var(f) to denote the set of variables
that f functionally depends on. That is, x ∈ D(f) if and only if there exists
α : Var(f) \ {x} → B, such that f [α] [x← ⊥] ⊕ f [α] [x← >] = >. The above
property can be checked by a SAT solver.
To discuss information leakage caused by a fault, we first define what it
means for a formula f to contain information about another formula g. We
define the weight of a Boolean function as #V (f) = |{α : V → B | f [α] = >}|.
Formulas f and g are statistically dependent if and only if #V (f ∧ g) ·#V (¬f) 6=
#V (¬f∧g) ·#V (f). That is, regardless of the observed value of f , the proportion
of assignments α for which g [α] = > is constant.
Example 2. Let V = {a, b, c} be a set of variables. Let f = a ∧ b, g = ¬a ∨ c,
and h = b⊕c be Boolean formulas. Formulas f and g are statistically dependent
because #V (f ∧ g) · #V (¬f) = 6 and #V (¬f ∧ g) · #V (f) = 10. Indeed, if
f [α] = >, then probably g [α] = ⊥, whereas if f [α] = ⊥, then g [α] = > is
just as likely as g [α] = ⊥. The formulas f and h are statistically independent
because #V (f ∧ h) ·#V (¬f) = 6 and #V (¬f ∧ h) ·#V (f) = 6.
We say that a Boolean formula f is balanced if and only if #V (f) = #V (¬f) =
2|V |−1. A Boolean variable x, interpreted as a formula, is inherently balanced
for any variable set x ∈ V as there are 2|V |−1 assignments α : V → B with
α(x) = >. Lemma 1 states that this can be extended to functions of the form
f = x⊕ g.
Lemma 1. Let f = x⊕ g be a Boolean formula with x /∈ Var(g). We have that
f is balanced.
Proof. Formula f is balanced if #V (x⊕g) = #V (x∧¬g)+#V (¬x∧g) = 2|V |−1.
Since x /∈ Var(g), we know that #V (x∧¬g) = #{x}(x)·#V \{x}(¬g) and similarly
#V (¬x ∧ g) = #{x}(¬x) ·#V \{x}(g). Therefore, since #{x}(x) = #{x}(¬x) = 1,
we have that
#V (x⊕ g) = #V \{x}(¬g) + #V \{x}(g) = #V \{x}(>) = 2|V \{x}| = 2|V |−1.
We measure the Boolean distance of two formulas f and g as the number of
assignments where their values are different. This is equivalent to the weight of
their difference #V (f ⊕ g). Lemma 2 states the connection between statistical
independence and Boolean distance.
Lemma 2. Let f and g be Boolean formulas and let f be balanced. Formulas f
and g are statistically independent if and only if their difference is balanced.
Proof. We start from the definition of statistical independence between f and
g. Since f is balanced, we can simplify the condition.
#V (f ∧ g) #V (¬f) = #V (¬f ∧ g) #V (f)
#V (f ∧ g) = #V (¬f ∧ g).
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We know that the assignments α that satisfy f ∧ g are all those that satisfy f ,
without those that satisfy f ∧ ¬g. We use this to show that the difference of f
and g must be balanced.
#V (f)−#V (f ∧ ¬g) = #V (¬f ∧ g)
#V (f ∧ ¬g) + #V (¬f ∧ g) = #V (f)
#V (f ⊕ g) = 2|V |−1.
3 Verification Method
In this section, we introduce a method for verifying resistance against SIFA.
That is, we show how to verify whether the fault-detection mechanism could
give away information about native secrets processed by a software computation
or hardware circuit. Our method focuses on proving the statistical independence
of the fault-detection value δ and any of the secrets s ∈ S. We do not show this
directly and instead try to prove the statistical independence using the incom-
pleteness, hiding, and inferred statistical independence properties we introduce
in this section. However, we first define the exact attack model considered in this
verification approach.
3.1 Attack Model
Formally proving resistance against SIFA requires a definition of the attacker’s
capabilities and the exact information they observe. We use an attack model that
is very similar to the one introduced by Daemen et al.[10]. We consider redundant
masked implementations of S-Boxes that the attacker can query. Figure 1 shows
a diagram of such an implementation, where the outputs of the two computation
units are used to compute the fault-detection value δ. With SIFA, the value of
δ is the only information the attacker receives from the computation. The goal
of an attacker is to learn information about the native secret values processed
by the computation. The inputs of the computation are categorized as masks
and secret shares. In the rest of the section, we say that M is the set of mask
variables, and S is the set of formulas representing the secrets. We, therefore,
have the set of input variables V = M ∪
⋃
s∈S Var(s).
As SIFA is a fault attack, the attacker has the technical capabilities to in-
troduce the fault that changes the value of an intermediate computation. If we
represent δ as a computational circuit, a fault modifies the output of precisely one
logic gate used during the computation. In our attack model, we consider faults
that can negate the value of the gate by causing a bit-flip, which also captures
many other fault models such as stuck-at faults for masked circuits [10]. The at-
tacker’s goal is to find a fault location that would cause a statistical dependency
between δ and one of the formulas s ∈ S. Our verification does not currently
take into account the possible effects of “glitchy” fault injections, i.e., faults
with specific timing behavior that causes the output of gates to change (glitch)
several times before reaching a stable logic state While it has been shown that
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such effects need to be taken into account for implementing masking correctly
in hardware, it is currently not clear if, or to what extend, they are relevant for
SIFA attacks in realistic attacker settings.
Proposition 1. A computation with a fault-detection value δ is SIFA resistant
against a fault-inducing attacker if δ is statistically independent of all native
secrets s ∈ S.
3.2 Incompleteness
First, we prove that a fault-detection formula δ that does not functionally depend
on all shares of a secret s, cannot be statistically dependent on s. A syntactic
version of this property is known as non-interference in the literature [5,4]. In-
tuitively, if one of the shares is absent from the formula δ, then an attacker
cannot infer anything about s without this missing piece of information. Defini-
tion 1 formally states this intuition of incomplete secrets. Lemma 3 states that
incompleteness is sufficient for statistical independence.
Definition 1. Let f be a formula, and s be a secret represented by the formula
s0⊕. . .⊕sd, where the shares si are variables. We say that a secret s is incomplete
in formula f whenever D(s) 6⊆ D(f).
Lemma 3. Let secret s = s0 ⊕ . . . ⊕ sd be incomplete in the fault-detection
formula δ. Then δ and s are statistically independent.
Proof. Since s is balanced per Lemma 1, δ and s are statistically independent if
their difference δ ⊕ s is balanced per Lemma 2. Let δ′ = δ [Var(δ) \ D(δ) 7→ ⊥]
be a simplified version of δ from which the functionally irrelevant variables have
been removed. Due to incompleteness, there must be an si ∈ D(s) such that
si /∈ Var(δ′ ⊕
⊕
j 6=i sj), and therefore per Lemma 1, δ ⊕ s is balanced.
3.3 Hiding
Assume that the formula δ is functionally dependent on all shares of a secret
s = s0 ⊕ . . . ⊕ sd, i.e., D(s) ⊆ D(δ). Incompleteness, as defined in Definition 1,
is thus not fulfilled. However, δ and s could still be statistically independent.
Intuitively, if δ is balanced and masked by some uniformly random value, it
cannot statistically correlate with any secret s ∈ S.
Definition 2. A uniformly random variable x hides a secret s ∈ S in the error-
detection formula δ whenever δ = x⊕ f , with x /∈ D(s) ∪ D(f).
Not all variables can hide secrets. Masks hide secrets because they are uni-
formly random by definition. Although individual shares si of a secret s ∈ S are
guaranteed to be uniformly random, their corresponding native secrets are not.
Consequently, when investigating the hiding property from Definition 2, we only
consider masks and shares of incomplete secrets in δ, as stated in Lemma 4.
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Lemma 4. Let δ be a formula, S′ be the set of secrets that are incomplete in δ,
i.e., S′ = {s ∈ S | D(s)∩D(δ) 6= ∅}, M be the uniformly random mask variables,
and X be the union X = M ∪
⋃
s∈S′ D(s). If there exists an x ∈ X that hides a
secret s ∈ S, then δ and s are statistically independent.
Proof. Because x hides s in δ, we know that δ⊕s = x⊕f⊕s is balanced according
to Lemma 1. As the difference of δ and s is balanced, they are statistically
independent according to Lemma 2.
Lemma 5 presents a method that tests whether the factorization needed for
the hiding property is possible. The method uses a SAT solver and is similar to
the method that checks functional dependencies.
Lemma 5. Let f be a Boolean formula and x ∈ Var(f) be a variable. Then
f = x⊕ f [x← ⊥] if and only if f [x← ⊥]⊕ f [x← >] = >.
Proof. We assume that f = x⊕f [x← ⊥] and show f [x← ⊥]⊕f [x← >] = >:
f [x← ⊥]⊕f [x← >] = (x⊕f [x← ⊥]) [x← ⊥]⊕ (x⊕f [x← ⊥]) [x← >] = >.
Similarly, assume that f [x← ⊥]⊕ f [x← >] = >. We prove f = x⊕ f [x← ⊥]
by showing that the two sides are equal under all values of x:
(x⊕ f [x← ⊥]) [x← ⊥] = f [x← ⊥]
(x⊕ f [x← ⊥]) [x← >] = (x⊕ f [x← >]⊕>) [x← >] = f [x← >] .
It is enough to find one uniformly random variable x to show that δ is sta-
tistically independent of all secrets s ∈ S. As discussed earlier, not all variables
in Var(δ) are eligible for the hiding property. Thus, our verification method only
checks the hiding property after determining incomplete secrets first.
3.4 Inferred Statistical Independence
Although incompleteness and hiding are enough in most cases, the structure
of δ can make them inapplicable. Therefore, it is possible that δ functionally
depends on some secret s, and no uniformly random value hides s in δ. Example 3
illustrates this situation.
Example 3. Let δ be the fault-detection formula with δ = δ0∨δ1, δ0 = x⊕s0 and
δ1 = y ⊕ s1 be its sub-formulas, M = {x, y} be the masks, and s = s0 ⊕ s1 be a
secret. Formula δ is functionally dependent on both s0 and s1, since there are no
assignments α : Var(δ) \ {si} → B such that δ[α] [si ← ⊥] ⊕ δ[α] [si ← >] = >.
Similarly, δ cannot be factorized into either δ = x⊕δ [x← ⊥] or δ = y⊕δ [y ← ⊥],
so neither x nor y hide s. However δ is indeed statistically independent of s
because #Var(δ)(δ ∧ s) ·#Var(δ)(¬δ) = #Var(δ)(¬δ ∧ s) ·#Var(δ)(δ) = 24.
Therefore, because of the structure of the fault-detection formula δ, there is
a real possibility that the incompleteness and hiding checks are not sufficient
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to show that δ does not statistically depend on any secrets. However, this can
be mitigated by inferring whether δ is statistically independent of s by looking
at its sub-formulas δi instead. Lemma 6 introduces a method for inferring the
statistical independence of two Boolean formulas f and g, where one has the
topmost operation Or, just like δ, and the other is a balanced function, just like a
secret. This property is inspired by correlation propagation used in Rebecca [8].
Lemma 6. Let f = a ∨ b and g be Boolean formulas with the variable sets
Var(f) ⊆ V and Var(g) ⊆ V . If ⊥, a, b, and a⊕ b are statistically independent
of g, then f is also statistically independent of g.
Proof. First, ⊥ and g are statistically independent if and only if g is balanced, so
#V (g) = #V (¬g) = 2|V |−1. Since g must be balanced, a, b, a⊕ b are statistically
independent of g if and only if their differences are balanced per Lemma 2, i.e.,
#V (a ⊕ g) = #V (b ⊕ g) = #V (a ⊕ b ⊕ g) = 2|V |−1. Summing up all of these
conditions and rearranging them yields:
#V (¬g) + #V (a⊕ g) + #V (b⊕ g) + #V (a⊕ b⊕ g) = 2|V |+1
#V (¬a ∧ ¬b ∧ ¬g) + 3 ·#V (a ∧ ¬b ∧ ¬g) + 3 ·#V (¬a ∧ b ∧ ¬g) +
+3 ·#V (¬a ∧ ¬b ∧ g) + #V (a ∧ ¬b ∧ g) + 3 ·#V (a ∧ b ∧ ¬g) +
+#V (¬a ∧ b ∧ g) + #V (a ∧ b ∧ g) = 2|V |+1
3 ·#V (f ⊕ g) + #V (¬(f ⊕ g)) = 2|V |+1
2 ·#V (f ⊕ g) + 2|V | = 2|V |+1
#V (f ⊕ g) = 2|V |−1.
Therefore, at least in the case where δ = δ0 ∨ δ1, we can infer that δ is
statistically independent of a secret s, as long as δ0, δ1, and s fulfill the conditions
of Lemma 6. Example 4 illustrates this.
Example 4. Let δ, δ0, δ1 and s be as in Example 3. By Lemma 1, s is balanced.
The hiding property applies for δ0, δ1 and δ0 ⊕ δ1, where x, y, and x⊕ y can be
factorized out respectively. According to Lemma 2, all of the prerequisites for
Lemma 6 are met, so we are able to show that δ is indeed statistically indepen-
dent of s, without testing the statistical independence definition explicitly.
However, in general, δ will be a formula of the form δ =
∨n
i=1 δi. Although
it is possible to apply Lemma 6 recursively, it is not ideal because we run into
the same problem we demonstrated in Example 3, just one recursive applica-
tion later. Luckily, Lemma 6 can be generalized to Or operations with multiple
arguments, as shown in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Let Φ = {φ1, . . . , φn} be a set of Boolean formulas, f =
∨n
i=1 φi be
their disjunction, g be another Boolean formula, and Var(f) ⊆ V and Var(g) ⊆ V
be their variables. If for all Ψ ∈ P(Φ), where P(·) is the power-set operation,
f ′ =
⊕
ψ∈Ψ ψ is statistically independent of g, then so is f .
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Proof. The proof proceeds by induction over the size of Φ, where we write Φn =
{φ1, . . . , φn} when referring to the set with n sub-formulas. Basis. The conditions
are trivially fulfilled for Φ1 = {φ1}, whereas Φ2 = {φ1, φ2} directly applies
Lemma 6. Step. We show that the conditions hold for Φn+1, under assumption
that they hold for Φn. We want to apply Lemma 6 to f = a ∨ b where a =
φn+1 and b =
∨n
i=1 φi. The statistical independence of ⊥, a and b with g is
guaranteed by respectively ∅ ∈ P(Φn+1), {φn+1} ∈ P(Φn+1), and P(Φn) ⊂
P(Φn+1) together with the induction hypothesis for Φn. Lastly, if g is balanced
and statistically independent of φn+1 like demonstrated above, then a ⊕ b is
statistically independent of g if and only if b is statistically independent of a⊕g.
This is guaranteed by {Ψ ∪ {φn+1} | Ψ ∈ P(Φn)} ⊂ P(Φn+1) and the induction
hypothesis. Therefore, if for all Ψ ∈ P(Φn+1) we have that f ′ =
⊕
ψ∈Ψ ψ is
statistically independent of g, then, according to Lemma 6 and the previous
observations, f =
∨n+1
i=1 φi is also statistically independent of g.
Theorem 1 suggests that if we prove that all linear combinations of the error
lines δi are statistically independent of a secret s, then we have indirectly shown
that their disjunction δ is also statistically independent of s. Additionally, the
condition of Theorem 1 can be further simplified because some of the linear
combinations produced by X ∈ P(Φ) could be equivalent. Instead of considering
Φ, we could instead consider the maximal linearly independent subset of Φ.
Lemma 7. Let Φ and g be as in Theorem 1. Let Φ′ ⊆ Φ be a linearly independent
subset of Φ, i.e., ∀φ ∈ Φ′. ∀Ψ ⊆ Φ′ \ {φ}. φ 6=
⊕
ψ∈Ψ ψ, and let Φ
′ be maximal,
i.e., ∀φ ∈ Φ\Φ′. ∃Ψ ⊆ Φ′. φ =
⊕
ψ∈Ψ ψ. If for all Ψ ⊆ Φ′,
⊕
ψ∈Ψ ψ is statistically
independent of g, then the same holds for all Ψ ⊆ Φ.
Proof. The stated implication relies on the maximality of the linearly indepen-
dent subset Φ′. In terms of spaces, Φ′ is a basis of Φ, meaning that it can represent
all elements of Φ as an Xor of a subset of Φ′, i.e., ∀φ ∈ Φ. ∃Ψ ⊆ Φ′. φ =
⊕
ψ∈Ψ ψ.






As stated in Lemma 7, instead of considering all linear combinations in Φ, it
is sufficient to consider only linear combinations of its maximally linearly inde-
pendent subset Φ′ when applying Theorem 1. In many cases, this substantially
reduces the number of checks our verification method performed.
3.5 Approximating Statistical Independence
Theorem 1, together with the optimized condition from Lemma 7, is powerful
enough to show that, given the mentioned conditions for δi, δ is statistically
independent of a secret s. The statistical independence of the linear combinations
of δi can be shown using the incompleteness and hiding properties discussed in
Sections 3.2 and 3.3. However, issuing exponentially many satisfiability queries
required by Theorem 1 is still undesirable. Therefore, we introduce an over-
approximation which only calls the SAT solver to perform factorization and
functional dependency tests for each relevant δi with all variables in Var(δi). We
Proving SIFA Protection of Masked Redundant Circuits 13
then use the gathered data to over-approximate the incompleteness and hiding
properties for all linear combinations of δi.
In general a Boolean formula f can be rewritten as an equivalent formula
f = g⊕h. Here g =
⊕
x∈X x is the linear sub-formula where X ⊆ Var(f) is a set
of variable symbols for which Lemma 5 applies, i.e., f [x← ⊥]⊕ f [x← >] = >.
Consequently, h is the remaining sub-formula of f , i.e., h = f [α] where α :
X 7→ ⊥ assigns ⊥ to all variables in X. Henceforth, we write C(f) to denote
the maximal set of variables that can be factorized out of f via Lemma 5,
i.e., C(f) = {x | x ∈ Var(f), f [x← ⊥]⊕ f [x← >] = >}. Furthermore, call f =
f lin ⊕ fnl the maximal factorization, where f lin =
⊕
x∈C(f) x, f
nl = f [α] and
α : C(f) 7→ ⊥. Knowing both C(f) and D(f) allows us to perform easy hiding and
incompleteness checks for f against some linear formula f ′. Additionally, C(·) and
D(·) allow us to approximate the maximal factorization for linear combinations
f =
⊕n
i=1 φi, where φi themselves are also formulas.
Lemma 8. Let f =
⊕n
i=1 φi be a formula with sub-formulas φi. The variable set
Ĉ(f) = 4ni=1C(φi) \
⋃n
i=1D(φi
nl) is an under-approximation of C(f). Similarly,
the set D̂(f) = 4ni=1C(φi) ∪
⋃n
i=1D(φi
nl) is an over-approximation of D(f). 1




lin and h =
⊕n
i=1 φi
nl, with f = g ⊕ h. The function g is linear by
construction, and because of the properties of Xor, only variables that appear in
an uneven number of sets C(φilin) = C(φi) are are part of C(g), and thus C(g) =
4ni=1C(φi). For the function h, we assume that no functional dependencies of any
φi




It follows that Ĉ(f) = C(g) \ X ⊆ C(f), as Ĉ(f) only contains variables that
factorizable in g and are not a functional dependency of h. Along the same lines,
we get D(f) ⊆ D̂(f) = C(g)∪X because it contains all variables except for those
that are in not essential in either g or h.
These two approximations are much easier to compute than the real variable
sets C(δ) and D(δ). Ideally, we first compute D(δi) and C(δi) for each of the
fault-detection values δi using a SAT solver. Afterward, when checking all their
linear combinations, we only use fast set computation operations from Lemma 8.
Since D̂(·) is an over-approximation, it must contain all functional dependencies
and possibly some spurious ones. If we show the incompleteness of a secret s with
D̂(·), we would have gotten the same result with D(·). Similarly, Ĉ(·) contains
a subset of the variables that can be factorized out of the formula. It is still a
factorization, although it is not guaranteed to be maximal like C(·). Therefore,
if we show that a secret is hidden by some uniformly random variable using Ĉ(·),
it is guaranteed to be hidden.
3.6 Verification Algorithm
In this section, we summarize how the verification algorithm works. In particular,
we focus on the order of checks performed by the algorithm and show how
1 Operator 4 signifies symmetric difference: A4B = (A ∪B) \ (A ∩B)
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Algorithm 1: Danira algorithm for verifying SIFA resistance
Input : fault detection formulas {δ1, . . . , δn}, δ :=
∨n
i=1 δi
masks M , secrets S =
{
s1, . . . , sd
}
Output: secure or unknown
1 R := M ; // variables that hide
2 K := ∅ ; // complete secrets
3 for s ∈ S do
4 if D(s) ⊆ D(δ) then K := K ∪ {s}; // mark as complete
5 if D(s) 6⊆ D(δ) then R := R ∪ (D(s) ∩ D(δ)); // shares can hide
6 if K = ∅ or R ∩ C(δ) 6= ∅ then return secure; // incomplete or hidden
7 G := ∅ ; // basis of δi formulas
8 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
9 if ∀G′ ⊆ G. δi 6=
⊕
g∈G′ g then G := G∪{δi}; // include δi in basis G
10 for G′ ⊆ G do
11 φ =
⊕
g∈G′ g ; // comb. of sub-formulas
12 if ∀s ∈ K.D(s) 6⊆ D̂(φ) then continue; // no secrets complete
13 if R ∩ Ĉ(φ) 6= ∅ then continue; // secrets are hidden
14 return unknown ; // φ maybe dependent
15 return secure ; // all φ independent
they correspond to the previous exposition. As described in Section 3.1, the
attacker can introduce a fault in any sub-formula φ of δ. The verification method
summarized in Algorithm 1 is given the faulted δ and its sub-formulas δi, the
set of masks M , and the set of formulas S representing each secret as a linear
combination of its shares. The show algorithm considers only one fault at a time,
and our tool Danira runs it separately for each possible fault location.
First, the algorithm computes the set K of complete secrets, i.e., secrets for
which δ functionally depends on all its shares. Simultaneously, the algorithm
computes the set R of uniformly random values that contains all masks M and
shares of incomplete secrets s /∈ K. In the rest of the algorithm, only values in
R can hide secrets. If there are no complete secrets in K or a uniformly random
variable from R can be factorized out of δ and hides all secrets in K, we know
that δ is statistically independent of the secrets S.
Next, the algorithm computes a maximal linearly independent subset G of
fault-detection values δi. As discussed previously in Lemma 6, it is sufficient
to apply Theorem 1 to this subset when proving statistical independence. The
algorithm computes the approximations D̂(φ) and Ĉ(φ) for all possible linear
combinations φ from G. It uses the approximations to check whether any of the
secrets in K are complete in D̂(φ), and if they are, whether any of the random
values from R appear in Ĉ(φ) and hide them. If we were able to show statistical
independence of secrets for all φ, Algorithm 1 declares the computation secure
for the given fault.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 is sound: if it returns secure, the analyzed fault in
the attack model from Section 3.1 is not exploitable via SIFA.
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Procedure Chi3: Implementation of a masked Keccak χ3 S-Box [10]
Input : {a0, a1}, {b0, b1}, {c0, c1},M = {mr,mt}
Output: {r0, r1}, {s0, s1}, {t0, t1}
1 ms := mr ⊕mt;
2 x0 := ¬b0 ∧ c1;
3 x2 := a1 ∧ b1;
4 x1 := ¬b0 ∧ c0;
5 x3 := a1 ∧ b0;
6 r0 := x0 ⊕mr;
7 t1 := x2 ⊕mt;
8 r0 := r0 ⊕ x1;
9 t1 := t1 ⊕ x3;
10 x0 := ¬c0 ∧ a1;
11 x2 := b1 ∧ c1;
12 x1 := ¬c0 ∧ a0;
13 x3 := b1 ∧ c0;
14 s0 := x0 ⊕ms;
15 r1 := x2 ⊕mr;
16 s0 := s0 ⊕ x1;
17 r1 := r1 ⊕ x3;
18 x0 := ¬a0 ∧ b1;
19 x2 := c1 ∧ a1;
20 x1 := ¬a0 ∧ b0;
21 x3 := c1 ∧ a0;
22 t0 := x0 ⊕mt;
23 s1 := x2 ⊕ms;
24 t0 := t0 ⊕ x1;
25 s1 := s1 ⊕ x3;
26 r0 := r0 ⊕ a0;
27 t1 := t1 ⊕ c1;
28 s0 := s0 ⊕ b0;
29 r1 := r1 ⊕ a1;
30 t0 := t0 ⊕ c0;
31 s1 := s1 ⊕ b1;
4 Case Studies
This section evaluates our new verification approach against the secured im-
plementations presented by Daemen et al.[10]. Danira 2 uses the netlist of a
combinatorial circuit as the input. It interprets the inputs as variables and the
intermediate computations as Boolean formulas. From a theoretical standpoint,
it does not matter whether the analyzed circuit has a state or not because we
only consider the outputs after the computation finishes.
In the rest of this section, we consider the SIFA-resistant masked imple-
mentations of Keccak χ3, all classes of quadratic 4-bit S-Boxes, and an AES
S-Box [10]. We argue that without a sophisticated verification method, it is ex-
tremely easy to introduce bugs that produce correct computations but break the
theoretical SIFA-resistance guarantees.
Finally, we summarize the performance of Danira on several versions of the
same designs.
4.1 Masked Keccak χ3
The Keccak permutation χ3 is a simple circuit with three inputs and three
outputs used in many lightweight ciphers. Implementing a masked version is
straightforward because of its low polynomial degree. Chi3 shows the masked
computation of χ3 proposed by Daemen et al.[10]. The secrets processed by the
circuit are a = a0⊕a1, b = b0⊕b1 and c = c0⊕c1, whereas mr and mt are used as
uniformly random masks. The results of the computation r, s, and t are also split
into two shares, respectively. The circuit was designed in such a way that the
outputs are used for fault detection. Given two redundant computations of Chi3
with outputs {r0, r1, s0, s1, t0, t1} and {r′0, r′1, s′0, s′1, t′0, t′1}, the fault-detection
values are defined as δ1 = r0 ⊕ r′0, . . . , δ6 = t1 ⊕ t′1.
Each line of Chi3 is a possible fault location according to our attack model
in Section 3.1. Introducing a bit-flip fault means negating the result of one such
line in one of the redundant computations. Our verification method goes through
2 Danira’s code is available at https://extgit.iaik.tugraz.at/scos/danira
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each of the fault locations, negates the result at that point in the computation,
and generates the fault-detection formulas δ1, . . . , δ6. We specify S = {a, b, c}
and M = {mr,mt}, and run Algorithm 1 to see if the considered fault could
leak information about the secrets.
We implemented the netlist for Chi3 manually, and Danira was able to verify
that the design proposed in [10] was indeed SIFA resistant. However, when we
synthesized an equivalent RTL design with Yosys, Danira reported that it could
not prove SIFA resistance. In the synthesized netlist, Yosys introduced a tempo-
rary gate v0 = ¬b0 which it used to simplify Line 2 to x0 := v0 ∧ c1 and Line 4
to x1 := v0 ∧ c0. Although this makes sense from an optimization perspective
because it effectively reduces the size of the circuit by one gate, it breaks the
SIFA resistance. A fault at this new gate v0 in the synthesized design is the same
as two faults at Lines 2 and 4. As a result, δ becomes statistically dependent on
c, which the attacker can exploit. Unfortunately, this demonstrates that (1) an
analysis on the gate level is unavoidable and (2) they must be implemented man-
ually, as synthesis tools or compilers break SIFA resistance while maintaining
functional correctness.
4.2 Masked AES S-Box
Compared to χ3, the AES S-Box is a significantly more complex circuit of high
polynomial degree. The authors of the CHES paper [10] propose a high-level
sketch of a SIFA-resistant masked AES S-Box. There are many ways to im-
plement this high-level description and achieving SIFA resistance is not trivial.
After several failed attempts, we managed to implement a protected version of
the proposed AES S-Box with the help of our new verification tool. We are con-
vinced that correctly protecting a circuit as large as an AES S-Box is infeasible
without the help of an automated verification method such as Danira.
4.3 Performance Evaluation
This section gives a breakdown of Danira’s performance on correctly (and incor-
rectly) protected implementations. We performed all experiments on a notebook
with an eight-core Intel i7-8550U 1.8GHz CPU and 16 GiB of memory.
As shown in Table 1, Danira instantly verified (or falsified) all tested Keccak
χ3 and quadratic 4-bit S-Box designs. We also demonstrate that for Keccak χ3
and the AES S-Box, even one re-used gate leads to vulnerabilities. Danira verifies
the SIFA resistance of our implementation in about three minutes. For the AES
S-Boxes, Danira performs significantly better than a version SILVER [24] which
we extended to verify SIFA resistance. However, although this shows Danira’s
potential, our extension of SILVER with construct as shown in Figure 1 is not
perfect and could be further improved by its authors.
In summary, the results of our experiments in Table 1 indicate that: (1) the
over-approximation we introduce in this paper is strong enough to prove SIFA
resistance for secure designs, and (2) our verification method applied by Danira
is fast enough for complex masked implementations.
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Table 1. Performance of Danira (D) and a modified version of SILVER [24] (S) for
different masked designs. Correct (incorrect) designs are denoted by Ë (é). In all cases,
the reused gate was the exploitable fault location.
Design Gates (∧) (⊕) Result D (s) S (s)
Keccak χ3, full Chi3 37 12 25 Ë 0.06 0.24
Keccak χ3, reuse ¬b0 36 12 24 é 0.05 0.07
Keccak χ3, reuse ¬c0 36 12 24 é 0.06 0.12
Keccak χ3, reuse ¬a0 36 12 24 é 0.06 0.18
4-bit perm. Q44 [10] 10 4 6 Ë 0.03 0.10
4-bit perm. Q412 [10] 20 8 12 Ë 0.05 0.16
4-bit perm. Q4293 [10] 30 12 18 Ë 0.05 0.23
4-bit perm. Q4294 [10] 30 12 18 Ë 0.04 0.21
4-bit perm. Q4299 [10] 50 20 30 Ë 0.07 0.41
4-bit perm. Q4300 [10] 36 12 24 Ë 0.06 0.26
AES S-Box, reuse g104 631 144 487 é 14.67 551.1
AES S-Box, reuse g240 631 144 487 é 83.28 1336.7
AES S-Box, reuse g360 631 144 487 é 135.04 1941.7
AES S-Box, full [10] 634 144 490 Ë 184.39 3297.4
5 Conclusion
Protecting masked implementations against SIFA is not straightforward. Design-
ers can make mistakes when implementing a specification that is supposed to be
secure. Additionally, compilers and synthesis tools can introduce simplifications
that break the SIFA-resistance guarantees. Danira solves these problems using
simple yet effective properties of redundant masked implementations to show
whether they are SIFA resistant. As demonstrated by our case studies, Danira
is able to verify designs that may be used in actual embedded systems. In cases
where Danira cannot prove the security of a design, it gives a developer detailed
debugging information about a problematic fault location.
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A SIFA on masked χ3 S-Box
a0 a1 b0 b1 c0 c1T0 T1 T2 T3
r0 r1 s0 s1 t0 t1
Fig. 3. SIFA against masked χ3 using 2 shares (from [10]). The induced difference
cancels out, e.g., if the conrete values of b0, b1 and c1 are all zero. If such a fault
injection is not detected via redundant computation, the native value b (i.e. b0⊕ b1) at
the input was zero (biased).
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B SIFA protected masked χ3 S-Box
a0 a1 b0 b1 c0 c1T0 T1 T2 T3
r0 r1 s0 s1 t0 t1
Fig. 4. SIFA protected masked χ3 using 2 shares (from [10]). For each possible fault
location it either holds that (1) the induced difference is canceled by a set of signals
that does not contain all shares of a native variable, or (2) the induced difference can be
detected at the S-Box output via redundant computations. In this concrete example,
the second property holds.
